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BAB. V. 
CATATAN PENUTUP 
 
A.REFLEKSI PERJALANAN PENELITIAN 
Penelitian ini berawal dari memandang, kemudian muncul ketertarikan, selanjutnya 
melibatkan diri secara intensif dalam penelusuran serta pembacaan karya-karya World 
Press Photo (WPPh). Di mana WPPh merupakan penghargaan kepada karya foto jurnalistik 
terbaik sepanjang tahun, sekaligus kepada pewarta foto yang menghasilkannya. Bila 
ditanyakan apa yang menjadi karakteristik khas penelitian ini, saya akan langsung 
menjawab: yaitu bahwa komunikasi visual dapat mendeskripsikan atau memberikan 
gambaran mengenai keadaan manusia (conditio humana) dengan segala karakteristik dan 
keunikannya. Manusia –dengan segala keunggulannya– memandang, menata ulang, dan 
memaknai realitas melalui bahasa. Meskipun manusia banyak menggunakan bahasa tulis 
dan bahasa verbal untuk mendeskripsikan dunia atau realitas, jauh dari kesadaran manusia, 
bahasa visual telah mengambil posisi terdepan dalam membantu manusia memahami dunia. 
Manusia sering diingatkan bahwa pada dasarnya dunia datang kepada manusia pertama-
tama secara visual. Misalnya, seorang anak mengenali ”ibu”-nya, sebelum anak tersebut 
mampu menyebutnya ”ibu”, apalagi menulis kata ”ibu”. 
Tema mengenai kehancuran tatanan kehidupan manusia1 selalu menarik untuk 
diabadikan oleh para pewarta foto di seluruh muka bumi ini melalui sebuah kamera. Hal 
tersebut mempunyai nilai dokumentatif  tinggi, di mana manusia selalu ingin mengabadikan 
seluruh perjalanan hidupnya. Dari masa kelahiran, perkembangan, hingga kematiannya 
bahkan kehancurannya. Kehidupan itu nyata, fenomenanya dapat diamati, dirasakan, 
hingga didokumentasikan –terutama dalam catatan fotografi–. Dengan menggunakan 
pendekatan studi ilmu komunikasi, psikologi, dan mempertanyakannya kembali melalui 
studi filsafat manusia, penulis memaparkan permasalahan yang dihadapi manusia dalam 
menjalani kehidupannya melalui fenomena yang terdokumentasikan dalam karya-karya 
World Press Photo of the Year 1997-2007. 
                                                 
1 Hal tersebut mengacu pada pengalaman buruk (negatif) yang dijalani manusia. Lihat Bab.I.bag.1.Negativitas, hal.9. 
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A.1. Kondisi Kemanusiaan 
Kondisi kemanusiaan, kata Thomas Hobbes (1982), merupakan kondisi sebuah 
peperangan, setiap manusia memerangi manusia yang lainnya. Keadaan asal manusia 
merupakan konflik antar manusia (individu maupun kelompok) yang tidak berkesudahan. 
Masalah yang dihadapi dalam hubungan manusia adalah pengenalan antar individu-
individu (Hobbes,1982, dalam Hardiman,2005:48). Bila fase pengenalan itu gagal, jika 
pada akhirnya tidak memperoleh pehamaman bahwa manusia-manusia yang dihadapi 
merupakan sesama kita, serta bagian nyata dari kehidupan kita. Bila mau jujur mengakui, 
orang lain sering diposisikan bahwa mereka adalah pengancam kehidupan kita. Adanya 
orang lain kemudian bahkan hadir sebagai neraka2, di mana segala macam kejahatan, 
kesalahan, dan pengalaman buruk (negatif) ada padanya. Ketika orang lain hadir sebagai 
pengancam kehidupannya, tentu bukan semata perkara epistemologis beralihnya situasi 
kepastian-diri atas pengalaman bilik terdalamnya, kepada kegagapan berhadapan dengan 
orang lain sebagai pihak asing. Ketika upaya menciutkan orang lain ke dalam kerangka 
pengetahuan gagal, maka keamanan eksistensi kita terancam. Saya tidak mempunyai kuasa, 
betapapun menggunakan segala daya nalar, ada di hadapan saya. la memaksa saya 
mengakui kemandiriannya, menerima keberlainannya (Hardiman,2005:50). Beragam 
masalah eksistensial ada di sana. 
Sejarah manusia dipenuhi peristiwa yang memperlihatkan betapa jauh dunia sehari-
hari dari refleksi bahwa ‘Yang Lain’ itu adalah sesama kita. Hampir semua filsuf besar 
mencurahkan waktunya untuk mencari landasan yang bisa mengokohkan keyakinan, bahwa 
orang tidak boleh semena-mena menambah penderitaan dunia. Orang yang pernah belajar 
sedikit filsafat kiranya paham hal berikut ini. Betapapun lahir dari luka-luka pedas jiwa 
yang menggurat lembaran sejarah, refleksi atas tuntutan moral tidak mengatakan orang 
harus berbuat apa. Ia bisa membuat kita berjaga tentang segala sesuatu yang bukan kita, 
tetapi bukan panduan atau pedoman mentah untuk bertindak semena-mena sebagai 
penegasan diri kita terhadap orang lain. Pedoman bertindak bagi masyarakat ada dalam 
pelajaran moral. Namur sejarah juga tidak kurang sesak dengan petuah dan himbauan 
                                                 
2 Jean Paul Sartre, 1989, Hell is Other People, hal.45. 
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moral, yang mana memagari manusia agar tidak terpeleset ke jurang kedurjanaan atau 
palung negativitas pengalaman manusia yang tak berdasar. Kenyataannya, bukan hanya 
upaya perluasan kekuasaan politik yang membawa korban dengan jumlah mengerikan, 
tetapi juga pemujaan bangsa, perlombaan melestarikan agama, sampai arogansi warna kulit. 
Dalam penelitian ini, kondisi manusia nyata tertampakkan dalam sejumlah karya 
World Press Photo of the Year 1997-2007. Foto sebagai rekaman jejak manusia, 
merupakan seperangkat sistem tanda, yang sekaligus merepresentasikan konstruksi realitas 
krisis melalui berbagai unsur, elemen, ekspresi komunikasi tersirat dalam lembaran karya 
foto jurnalistik. Dalam rutinitas hidup manusia, sejumlah entitas ekspresi komunikasi itu 
dapat menjadi semacam wahana instrumentalis untuk memahami serta menjelaskan 
rekonstruksi negativitas pengalaman manusia menuju penafsiran dan pengungkapan makna. 
Dewan juri WPPh memilih karya fotografer Agence France-Presse (AFP), Hocine, yang 
mengabadikan dampak pembunuhan massal di Bentalha, Algeria 1997, selanjutnya 
fotografer Washington Post, Dayna Smith yang mengabadikan pemakaman tentara KLA 
saat konflik di Kosovo, Yugoslavia, 1998. Kemudian fotografer Berlingske Tidende, Erik 
Refner merekam pengkafanan bocah di kamp pengungsian Jalozai, Pakistan, 2001. Jean 
Marc-Bouju, Associated Press (AP), di pusat tawanan perang Irak, di Najaf, 2003. Serta 
fotografer Spencer Platt, Getty Images, yang meliput agresi Israel di Lebanon Selatan, 
2006. Pada kategori kehidupan sosial, fotografer Lara Jo Regan, Life Magazine, yang 
merekam kehidupan keluarga miskin dari Mexico yang hidup di Texas, AS, 1999. 
Kemudian peristiwa bencana alam, fotografer Eric Gregorian, Polaris Image, merekam 
nestapa warga Iran yang mengalami gempa dasyat pada tahun 2002. Tentunya tragedi 
tsunami Asia di India yang direkam oleh fotografer Arko Datta, Reuters, 2004. Serta 
fotografer, Finbarr O’Reilly, Reuters, yang menyelingi dengan tragedi kelaparan di Tahova, 
Niger, 2005. Dari semua peristiwa itu, kita mengetahui betapa rumit dan gaduhnya dunia 
ini. Lalu kapan kita bisa hening sejenak untuk sekedar mempertanyakan kembali, 
bagaimana kita memaknai kehidupan ini? 
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Tentulah hal tersebut bukan karena kata kehilangan makna. Sebaliknya, dalam kata 
makna dalam suatu imaji kehidupan dipertaruhkan. Masalah epistemologis3 kembali 
dipertanyakan di sini. Amatilah misalnya racikan ganjil kata dan agama di negeri ini yang 
bisa melahirkan kesimpulan, bahwa tindakan dinilai baik atau buruk bukan berdasarkan 
tindakan itu sendiri, melainkan siapa yang melakukannya dan demi apa. Pada tataran 
pemikiran mungkin ada orang yang masih mau mencoba melakukan pembelaan. Bukankah 
tidak ada nilai-nilai moral yang umum, yang universal? Bukankah pengetahuan moral 
bergantung pada budaya dan kebiasaan di tempat orang belajar nilai-nilainya? 
Pertanyaannya, bagaimana relativisme macam itu mau dipertahankan menghadapi tuntutan 
etis menyangkut hidup banyak orang? Lagipula, kalau nilai-nilai universal ditolak, 
bagaimana mau menyelesaikan konflik? Bagaimana akan membedakan keyakinan yang 
benar dan keyakinan yang seolah benar? Atas dasar perasaan, makna atau kepentingan 
sendiri? 
Sesuatu yang bermula dari penggugatan terhadap keangkuhan kata mengklaim 
realitas, berujung di kekalutan membedakan citra dengan realitas. Kelangkaan informasi 
berisi pengetahuan memadai, menggiring pengalaman konkret terbenam dalam 
ketidaktahuan dan kelupaan. Di tengah kegagapan meraih citra, saat kepayahan menimbang 
kadar kebenaran dan kesemuan, kits melompat ke ketinggian normatif hanya untuk 
terperosok ke zaman Hobbesian4 atau para ilmuwan biologis yang terlanjur 
menyamaratakan manusia pada taraf species hewan. Hidup sehari-hari mengajari kita, 
ketergesaan sering membawa serta gejala lupa. Kita lupa bahwa di dalam bilik paling 
tersembunyi sukma manusia meletak labirin lengang yang tidak mungkin dikerutkan dan 
diciutkan ke petuah, khotbah, cita-cita kesalehan, dan semacamnya. Lebih sering manusia 
adalah mahluk kedalaman-batin yang merupakan kawasan gelap tak terjamah. Tentang apa 
yang sering lolos tak tertampung oleh hiruk pikuk seruan moral inilah yang ingin 
disampaikan dalam penelitian ini. Seperti dengan sederhana sudah dipaparkan di atas, 
                                                 
3 Lihat permasalahan epistemologis dalam hubungan antar manusia pada Bab.IV.bag. C.1. Membuka Jalan bagi Korban 
Destruksi, hal.139. 
4 Bagi Hobbes, manusia adalah mahluk instingtif. Moralitas bukan buah kesadaran dari dalam diri manusia sendiri, 
melainkan harus secara otoriter dipaksakan kepadanya. Manusia menaati hukum moral karena takut terhadap hukum 
Tuhan, serta taat kepada hukum karena takut kepada negara (Hobbes,1982, dalam Hardiman,2005:58) 
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kehendak baik apalagi paksaan untuk bertindak baik tidak pernah memadai untuk 
membuahkan kesadaran mengapa kejahatan perlu ditolak. Kekerasan massa dan trauma 
yang bermuara pada negativitas pengalaman manusia, bukan hanya perkara moral dan 
sanksi hukum. Apalagi ketika moralitas dan hukum semata perebutan kepentingan untuk 
saling menguasai antar manusia. 
Penulis menemukan dua hal yang mengerucut dalam satu butir utama. ”Apa-yang-
seharusnya” tidak lagi bisa kita pahami semata melalui konsep-konsep abstrak mengenai 
manusia, diri, masyarakat. Tetapi, sebelum sampai pada cita-cita, kenalilah dan pahamilah 
realitas terselubung paling mencemaskan dari manusia: kerapuhan dan kerentanan jiwa 
manusia. Segala yang jahat bukan sesuatu yang dengan cara magis menyergap dari luar, 
menguasai dan mencemarkan manusia. Kejahatan ekstrim merupakan kawasan tanpa 
bahasa, kesenyapan yang berbahaya. Tetapi, kegagalan menuturkan pengetahuan dalam 
hubungan antar manusia, merupakan prasyarat bagi terjadinya kejahatan. Kejahatan dan 
segala hal yang negatif itu berada dalam ekstistensi manusia sendiri. Tanpa kesadaran diri 
dan keheningan dalam mengendapkan makna kehidupan bersama, manusia akan 
terus menerus terjebak dalam pusaran badai negativitas serta kehilangan kuasa atas 
diri sendiri. 
Mengenai kehidupan manusia, terdapat permenungan yang mendalam mengenai hak 
hidup manusia, sebagai hak paling dasar (asasi) seorang individu, yang membuat hak-hak 
lain menjadi bermakna. Hak asasi manusia ditujukan untuk menjaga martabat manusia dan 
keutuhan manusia secara individual5. Tugas setiap insan manusia adalah menghormati hak-
hak asasi manusia dan seharusnya juga turut merasakan penderitaan atas pelanggaran hak 
asasi yang menimpa sesama manusia. Kemajuan moral dipengaruhi rasa empati terhadap 
penderitaan manusia. Empati merupakan sikap yang baik karena seseorang akan terdorong 
untuk mempunyai sikap solidaritas kepada sesama tanpa membedakan latar belakang ras, 
agama, suku, keturunan hingga afiliasi politik manapun. Seperti yang diungkapkan filsuf 
asal Argentina, Eduardo Rabossi, bahwa budaya hak asasi manusia merupakan sebuah 
budaya yang menghargai pilihan-pilihan setiap individu dalam hidupnya.  
                                                 
5 Bdk. Eko Wijayanto (2009), Merenungkan Hak Hidup. (Kompas, Sabtu,26 Desember 2009, hal.7) 
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A.2. Catatan Mengenai Cara Memahami dan Menjelaskan 
Pendekatan hermeneutika Paul Ricoeur yang diterapkan dalam penelitian ini 
digunakan sebagai langkah kerja untuk membedah struktur teks (foto) seperti dipaparkan 
pada bab I. Ricoeur bersepakat bahwa strukturalisme dalam mengurai struktur yang 
terkandung dalam teks (foto), telah berhasil membawa sebuah pemahaman awal yakni 
mengeluarkan sense makna dari teks. Bagi Ricoeur, teks tidak dapat ditafsirkan seperti 
peristiwa langsung ditafsirkan, sebab teks, termasuk wicara yang direkam, dokumentasi 
gambar, memiliki bentuk permanen yang terlepas dari situasi asli teks tersebut. Dengan 
kata lain, dengan melepaskan teks dari situasi, yang disebut penjarakan (distanciation), teks 
bisa memiliki makna yang berbeda dengan apa yang sebenarnya dikehendaki 
pengarangnya. 
Dalam pandangan Ricoeur, hermeneutik memiliki dua aspek, yaitu penjelasan 
(explanation) yang bersifat empiris dan analitis, yaitu menjelaskan peristiwa berdasarkan 
pola antarbagian yang terobservasi; dan pemahaman (understanding) yang bersifat sintetis, 
yaitu menjelaskan peristiwa secara keseluruhan berdasarkan interpretasi. Dalam 
hermeneutika, seorang penafsir akan memecah belah teks menjadi bagian-bagian kecil, 
mencari pola-pola tertentu, dan memulai dari awal lagi untuk menjelaskan maknanya secara 
keseluruhan. Oleh karena itu, Ricoeur percaya adanya hubungan antara penafsir dan teks 
(Sumaryono,1993:103). Teori Ricoeur ini memungkinkan sebuah proses intrepretasi yang 
kreatif, yang membutuhkan sebuah pola kerja yang memiliki rute melingkar atau spiral. 
Peristiwa pemahaman terjadi ketika cakrawala makna historis dan asumsi orang 
berpadu dengan cakrawala tempat karya itu berada. Hermeneutika melihat sejarah sebagai 
dialog hidup antara masa lalu, masa kini, dan masa depan. Kunci pemahaman adalah 
pertisipasi dan keterbukaan, bukan manipulasi dan pengendalian. Sebagai sebuah metode 
penafsiran, hermeneutika tidak hanya memandang teks, tetapi juga berusaha menyelami 
kandungan makna literalnya. Hermeneutika berusaha menggali makna dengan 
mempertimbangkan horison-horison (cakrawala) yang melingkupi teks tersebut. Horison 
yang dimaksud adalah horison teks, pengarang, dan pembaca. Dengan memperhatikan 
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ketiga horison tersebut diharapkan suatu upaya pemahaman atau penafsiran menjadi 
kegiatan rekonstruksi dan reproduksi makna teks, yang selain melacak bagaimana suatu 
teks dimunculkan oleh pengarangnya dan muatan apa yang masuk dan ingin dimasukkan 
oleh pengarang ke dalam teks, juga berusaha melahirkan kembali makna sesuai dengan 
situasi dan kondisi saat teks dibaca atau dipahami.  
Selanjutnya, pandangan tentang pemahaman Ricoeur ini mirip dengan Gadamer, 
”pemahaman adalah perpaduan antar-cakrawala”. Seseorang tidak mungkin 
mengabstraksikan atau memencilkan suatu peristiwa dengan latar belakang atau 
cakrawalanya dari peristiwa-peristiwa lainnya. Tidak ada satu peristiwa sejarah pun yang 
bukan merupakan kelanjutan dari peristiwa-peristiwa yang mendahuluinya. Jadi, ada 
rangkaian peristiwa di mana peristiwa yang satu menyebabkan atau mengakibatkan 
peristiwa-peristiwa lainnya. 
Pada penelitian ini cara memahami dan menjelaskan dalam lingkaran hermeneutik 
Paul Ricoeur terproyeksikan sebagai berikut. Mula-mula teks (karya/wacana yaitu karya 
World Press Photo of the Year 1997-2007) ditempatkan sebagai obyek yang diteliti 
sekaligus sebagai subyek atau pusat yang otonom. Kemudian teks sebagai fakta ontologi 
dipahami dengan cara mengobyektivasi strukturnya. Dengan cara menentukan kunci atau 
mendiskripsikan konteks yang diperbincangkan. Pemahaman semakin meluas ketika masuk 
pada lapis simbolisasi, yaitu dengan mengungkap makna implisit menjadi eksplisit. Hal ini 
terjadi sebab di sini tafsir telah melampaui batas struktur. Kode simbolik yang dipancarkan 
teks dan dikaitkan dengan berbagai persoalan di luar dirinya menuntut disiplin ilmu lain 
untuk melengkapi tafsir atau intepretasi. Yang dituju dari proses itu adalah ditemukan atau 
diturunkannya makna. Tampak bahwa makna dan pesan dalam tafsir hermeneutik berada 
pada wilayah yang paling luas dan paling berjauhan dengan teks (karya/wacana/foto 
sebagai fakta ontologisnya), tetapi tetap berada di dalam cakrawala yang dipancarkan teks 
(negativitas pengalaman manusia). Tahap selanjutnya adalah peleburan cakrawala, yaitu 
menginterpretasikan wacana dan menggabungkannya dalam sebuah wacana baru. Satu hal 
penting dalam metode hermeneutika Paul Ricoeur adalah adanya penggabungan pandangan 
baru sebagai wilayah argumentasi terbuka. 
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B.REKOMENDASI PENELITIAN SELANJUTNYA 
Terdapat banyak hal yang dapat ditindaklanjuti melalui penelitian selanjutnya, yaitu: 
Pertama, melakukan studi-studi analisis wacana sejenis dari berbagai obyek realitas yang 
dapat diketemukan ketika berinteraksi dan berkomunikasi dengan diri sendiri atau kepada 
orang lain, baik melalui ragam instrumen media massa mainstream maupun konvensional. 
Studi sejenis dapat juga merekonstruksi wacana alternatif, seperti pada teks tertulis dan 
audiovisual secara lebih terfokus. 
Kedua, studi mengenai proses produksi dan reproduksi bahasa; pesan dan informasi 
dalam komunikasi kelompok (group communication) yang sedikit-banyak terkait dengan 
kepentingan cultural studies, yang dalam perkembangan ke depan akan semakin mendapat 
perhatian dari berbagai konsentrasi studi dan kajian Ilmu Komunikasi, terutama karena ada 
irisan akomodatif dengan berbagai cabang ilmu lainnya, misalnya psikologi, antropologi, 
hingga mempertautkannya dengan pengetahuan filsafat. 
Ketiga, mengenai pendekatan hermeneutika dan komunikasi. Hermeneutika yang 
berpangkal pada permasalahan interpretasi, dan komunikasi, yang berbasiskan isi pemikiran 
perlu mendapat perhatian dalam penelitian komunikasi, seperti dari dokumen tertulis lain 
untuk membuka diskursus ideologi, yang signifikan dengan topik penelitian melalui studi 
analisis wacana pluralis maupun kritis. 
 
ÕÕÕ 
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“Into the Valley of Death” 
From Vanity Fair Magazines 
 
Sergeant Joshua McDonough and Specialist Miguel Gutierrez fire grenades and automatic 
weapons from the Restrepo bunker. Photographs by Tim Hetherington. 
A strategic passage wanted by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 
Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley is among the deadliest 
pieces of terrain in the world for U.S. forces. One 
platoon is considered the tip of the American spear. Its 
men spend their days in a surreal combination of 
backbreaking labor—building outposts on rocky 
ridges—and deadly firefights, while they try to avoid the 
mistakes the Russians made. Sebastian Junger and 
photographer Tim Hetherington join the platoon’s 
painfully slow advance, as its soldiers laugh, swear, and 
run for cover, never knowing which of them won’t make 
it home.  
by Sebastian Junger  
 
 
 
  
167 
 
January 2008  
The 20 men of Second Platoon move through the village single file, keeping behind trees 
and stone houses and going down on one knee from time to time to cover the next man 
down the line. The locals know what is about to happen and are staying out of sight. We 
are in the village of Aliabad, in Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley, and the platoon radioman 
has received word that Taliban gunners are watching us and are about to open fire. Signals 
intelligence back at the company headquarters has been listening in on the Taliban field 
radios. They say the Taliban are waiting for us to leave the village before they shoot. 
Below us is the Korengal River and across the valley is the dark face of the Abas Ghar 
ridge. The Taliban essentially own the Abas Ghar. The valley is six miles long, and the 
Americans have pushed halfway down its length. In 2005, Taliban fighters cornered a 
four-man navy-seal team that had been dropped onto the Abas Ghar, and killed three of 
them, then shot down the Chinook helicopter that was sent in to save them. All 16 
commandos on board died.  
Dusk is falling and the air has a kind of buzzing tension to it, as if it carries an electrical 
charge. We only have to cover 500 yards to get back to the safety of the firebase, but the 
route is wide open to Taliban positions across the valley, and the ground has to be crossed 
at a run. The soldiers have taken so much fire here that they named this stretch “the 
Aliabad 500.” Platoon leader Matt Piosa, a blond, soft-spoken 24-year-old lieutenant from 
Pennsylvania, makes it to a chest-high stone wall behind the village grade school, and the 
rest of the squad arrives behind him, laboring under the weight of their weapons and body 
armor. The summer air is thick and hot, and everyone is sweating like horses. Piosa and his 
men were here to talk to the local elder about a planned water-pipe project for the village, 
and I can’t help thinking that this is an awful lot of effort for a five-minute conversation. 
Photos: View a Web-exclusive slide show of 
Hetherington’s soldier portraits from Afghanistan. Also: 
more of Hetherington’s photos from Afghanistan. 
I’m carrying a video camera and running it continually 
so that I won’t have to think about turning it on when 
the shooting starts. It captures everything my memory 
doesn’t. Piosa is about to leave the cover of the stone 
wall and push to the next bit of cover when I hear a 
staccato popping sound in the distance. “Contact,” Piosa 
says into his radio and then, “I’m pushing up here,” but 
he never gets the chance. The next burst comes in even 
tighter and the video jerks and yaws and Piosa screams, 
“A tracer just went right by here!” Soldiers are popping 
up to empty ammo clips over the top of the wall and 
Piosa is shouting positions into the radio and tracers 
from our heavy machine guns are streaking overhead 
into the darkening valley and a man near me shouts for someone named Buno.  
Buno doesn’t answer. That’s all I remember for a while—that and being incredibly thirsty. 
It seems to go on for a long, long time. 
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The Center Cannot Hold 
By many measures, Afghanistan is falling apart. The Afghan opium crop has flourished in 
the past two years and now represents 93 percent of the world’s supply, with an estimated 
street value of $38 billion in 2006. That money helps bankroll an insurgency that is now 
operating virtually within sight of the capital, Kabul. Suicide bombings have risen 
eightfold in the past two years, including several devastating attacks in Kabul, and as of 
October, coalition casualties had surpassed those of any previous year. The situation has 
gotten so bad, in fact, that ethnic and political factions in the northern part of the country 
have started stockpiling arms in preparation for when the international community decides 
to pull out. Afghans—who have seen two foreign powers on their soil in 20 years—are 
well aware of the limits of empire. They are well aware that everything has an end point, 
and that in their country end points are bloodier than most. 
The Korengal is widely considered to be the most dangerous valley in northeastern 
Afghanistan, and Second Platoon is considered the tip of the spear for the American forces 
there. Nearly one-fifth of all combat in Afghanistan occurs in this valley, and nearly three-
quarters of all the bombs dropped by nato forces in Afghanistan are dropped in the 
surrounding area. The fighting is on foot and it is deadly, and the zone of American control 
moves hilltop by hilltop, ridge by ridge, a hundred yards at a time. There is literally no safe 
place in the Korengal Valley. Men have been shot while asleep in their barracks tents. 
Second Platoon is one of four in Battle Company, which covers the Korengal as part of the 
Second Battalion of the 503rd Infantry Regiment (airborne). The only soldiers to have 
been deployed more times since the September 11 attacks are from the 10th Mountain 
Division, which handed the Korengal over last June. (Tenth Mountain had been slated to 
go home three months earlier, but its tour was extended while some of its units were 
already on their way back. They landed in the United States and almost immediately got 
back on their planes.) When Battle Company took over the Korengal, the entire southern 
half of the valley was controlled by the Taliban, and American patrols that pushed even a 
few hundred yards into that area got attacked. 
If there was one thing Battle Company knew how to do, though, it was fight. Its previous 
deployment had been in Afghanistan’s Zabul Province, and things were so bad there that 
half the company was on psychiatric meds by the time they got home. Korengal looked 
like it would be even worse. In Zabul, they had been arrayed against relatively 
inexperienced youths who were paid by Taliban commanders in Pakistan to fight—and 
die. In the Korengal, on the other hand, the fighting is funded by al-Qaeda cells who 
oversee extremely well-trained local militias. Battle Company took its first casualty within 
days, a 19-year-old private named Timothy Vimoto. Vimoto, the son of the brigade’s 
command sergeant major, was killed by the first volley from a Taliban machine gun 
positioned around half a mile away. He may well not have even heard the shots. 
I went to the Korengal Valley to follow Second Platoon throughout its 15-month 
deployment. To get into the valley, the American military flies helicopters to the Korengal 
Outpost—the kop, as it’s known—roughly halfway down the valley. The kop has a landing 
zone and a clutch of plywood hooches and barracks tents and perimeter walls made of dirt-
filled hesco barriers, many now shredded by shrapnel. When I arrived, Second Platoon was 
stationed primarily at a timber-and-sandbag outpost named Firebase Phoenix. There was 
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no running water or power, and the men took fire nearly every day from Taliban positions 
across the valley and from a ridgeline above them that they called Table Rock. 
I spent a couple of weeks with Second Platoon and left at the end of June, just before 
things got bad. The Taliban ambushed a patrol in Aliabad, mortally wounding the platoon 
medic, Private Juan Restrepo, and then hammered a column of Humvees that tore out of 
the kop to try to save him. Rounds rattled off the armor plating of the vehicles, and rocket-
propelled grenades plowed into the hillsides around them. One day in July, Captain Daniel 
Kearney, the 27-year-old commanding officer of Battle Company, counted 13 firefights in 
a 24-hour period. A lot of the contact was coming from Table Rock, so Kearney decided to 
end that problem by putting a position on top of it. Elements of the Second and Third 
Platoons and several dozen local workers moved up the ridge after dark and hacked 
furiously at the shelf rock all night long so that they would have some minimal cover when 
dawn broke. 
A Black Hawk helicopter comes in to land on the roof 
of a village house in Yaka China to take out Captain 
Dan Kearney following a village meeting to discuss 
insurgent activity. 
Sure enough, daylight brought bursts of heavy-
machine gun fire that sent the men diving into the 
shallow trenches they had just dug. They fought until 
the shooting stopped and then they got back up and continued to work. There was no loose 
dirt up there to fill the sandbags, so they broke up the rock with pickaxes and then 
shoveled pieces into the bags, which they piled up to form crude bunkers. Someone 
pointed out that they were actually “rock bags,” not sandbags, and so “rock bags” became 
a platoon joke that helped them get through the next several weeks. They worked in 100-
degree heat in full body armor and took their breaks during firefights, when they got to lie 
down and return fire. Sometimes they were so badly pinned down that they just lay there 
and threw rocks over their heads into the hescos. 
But rock bag by rock bag, hesco by hesco, the outpost got built. By the end of August the 
men had moved roughly 10 tons of dirt and rock by hand. They named the outpost 
Restrepo, after the medic who was killed, and succeeded in taking the pressure off Phoenix 
mainly by redirecting it onto themselves. Second Platoon began taking fire several times a 
day, sometimes from distances as close as a hundred yards. The terrain drops off so steeply 
from the position that their heavy machine guns couldn’t angle downward enough to cover 
the slopes below, so the Taliban could get very close without being exposed to fire. 
Lieutenant Piosa had his men lay coils of concertina wire around the position and rig 
claymore mines hardwired to triggers inside the bunkers. If the position were in danger of 
getting overrun, the men could detonate the claymores and kill everything within 50 yards. 
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The Quiet Americans 
Sergeant Kevin Rice’s tattoo bears testimony to fallen 
friends from a previous deployment. 
I return to Second Platoon in early September, walking 
out to Restrepo with a squad who are going to 
evacuate a soldier who has broken his ankle. The 
hillsides are steep and covered with loose shale, and 
nearly every man in the company has taken a fall that 
could have killed him. When we arrive, the men of 
Second Platoon have finished work for the day and are 
sitting behind hescos, tearing open pouches of ready-
to-eat meals (M.R.E.’s). They go to sleep almost as 
soon as it gets dark, but I stay up talking to the 
Weapons Squad sergeant, Kevin Rice. At 27, Rice is 
considered the “old man” of the platoon. He grew up 
on a dairy farm in Wisconsin and says that nothing he 
has done building Restrepo was any harder than the work he did around the farm as a kid. 
He has a tattoo of dancing bears on his left arm—a tribute to the Grateful Dead—and the 
names of men who were lost in Zabul on his right. He keeps an expression of slight 
bemusement on his face except during firefights, when he simply looks annoyed. Rice is 
known for his weird calm under fire. He’s also known for fighting with the kind of slow, 
vengeful precision that most men can barely maintain on the pool table. I ask what he 
thinks about an all-out attack on Restrepo, and he just chuckles. 
“I’m kind of looking forward to it,” he says. “It would be very entertaining. It would be up 
close and personal.” 
With that, Sergeant Rice stretches out on his cot and goes to sleep. 
Dawn, the Abas Ghar curtained by mist. It will burn off by midmorning, leaving the men 
drenched in sweat when they work. A patrol comes in before sunrise, elements of the 
Second who had gone to the kop for a few days of cooked food and hot showers, maybe a 
phone call to their wives. Fully loaded with ammunition, weapons, and food, they can 
easily have 120 pounds on their backs. They dump their rucksacks in the dirt and several 
of them light up cigarettes. Some are still breathing hard from the climb. “Quitters never 
win,” Rice observes. 
A 22-year-old private named Misha Pemble-Belkin is sitting on the edge of a cot, cutting 
the pocket off his uniform. On his left forearm Pemble-Belkin has a tattoo of the 
Endurance, Sir Ernest Shackleton’s ship that became entrapped by sea ice in Antarctica in 
1915. “It’s the greatest adventure story ever,” Pemble-Belkin says by way of explanation. 
He takes the pocket he has just liberated and sews it over a rip in the crotch of his pants, 
which he is still wearing. The men spend their days clambering around shale hillsides 
dotted with holly trees, and most of their uniforms are in shreds. Pemble-Belkin uses his 
free time back at the kop painting and playing guitar, and says that his father was a labor 
organizer who supports the troops absolutely, but has protested every war the United 
States has ever been in. His mother sends him letters written on paper she makes by hand. 
  
171 
 
The workday hasn’t started yet, and the men sit around talking and watching Pemble-
Belkin sew his pants. They talk about what kinds of bombs they’d like to drop on the 
valley. They talk about how the militants try to hit airplanes with R.P.G.’s—a 
mathematical near impossibility. They talk about post-traumatic stress disorder, which 
many of the men in the unit have to some degree. One man says he keeps waking up on his 
hands and knees, looking for a live grenade that he thinks someone has just thrown at him. 
He wants to throw it back. 
The sun pries itself over the eastern ridges and half the platoon gets to work filling hescos 
while the other half mans the heavy weapons. The men work around the outpost in teams 
of three or four, one man hacking at the rock shelf with a pickax while another shovels the 
loose dirt into sandbags and a third drops the biggest chunks into an ammo can, then walks 
over to a half-full hesco, muscles the can over his head, and dumps the contents in. 
“Prison labor is basically what I call it,” says a man I know only as Dave. Dave is a 
counter-insurgency specialist who spends his time at remote outposts, advising and trying 
to learn. He wears his hair longer than most soldiers, a blond tangle that after two weeks at 
Restrepo seems impressively styled with dirt. I ask him why the Korengal is so important. 
“It’s important because of accessibility to Pakistan,” he says. “Ultimately, everything is 
going to Kabul. The Korengal is keeping the Pech River Valley safe, the Pech is keeping 
Kunar Province stable, and hence what we are hoping is all that takes the pressure off 
Kabul.” 
While we are talking, some rounds come in, snapping over our heads and continuing on up 
the valley. They were aimed at a soldier who had exposed himself above a hesco. He drops 
back down, but otherwise, the men hardly seem to notice. 
“The enemy doesn’t have to be good,” Dave adds. “They just have to be lucky from time 
to time.” 
Rules of Engagement 
The Korengal is so desperately fought over because it is the first leg of a former 
mujahideen smuggling route that was used to bring in men and weapons from Pakistan 
during the 1980s. From the Korengal, the mujahideen were able to push west along the 
high ridges of the Hindu Kush to attack Soviet positions as far away as Kabul. It was 
called the Nuristan-Kunar corridor, and American military planners fear that al-Qaeda is 
trying to revive it. If the Americans simply seal off the valley and go around, Taliban and 
al-Qaeda fighters currently hiding near the Pakistani towns of Dir and Chitral could use the 
Korengal as a base of operations to strike deep into eastern Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden 
is rumored to be in the Chitral area, as are his second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, 
and a clutch of other foreign fighters. While thousands of poorly trained Taliban recruits 
martyr themselves in southern Afghanistan, bin Laden’s most highly trained fighters ready 
themselves for the next war, which will happen in the East. 
In addition to its strategic value, the Korengal also has the perfect population in which to 
root an insurgency. The Korengalis are clannish and violent and have successfully fought 
off every outside attempt to control them—including the Taliban’s in the 1990s. They 
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practice the extremist Wahhabi version of Islam and speak a language that even people in 
the next valley over cannot understand. That makes it extremely difficult for the American 
forces to find reliable translators. The Korengalis have terraced the steep slopes of their 
valley into fertile wheat fields and built stone houses that can withstand earthquakes (and, 
as it turns out, air strikes), and have set about cutting down the enormous cedar trees that 
cover the upper elevations of the Abas Ghar. Without access to heavy machinery, they 
simply grease the mountainsides with cooking oil and let the trees rocket several thousand 
feet to the valley below. 
The timber industry has given the Korengalis a measure of wealth that has made them 
more or less autonomous in the country. Hamid Karzai’s government tried to force them 
into the fold by regulating the export of timber, but the Taliban quickly offered to help 
them smuggle it out to Pakistan in return for assistance fighting the Americans. The timber 
is moved past corrupt border guards or along a maze of mountain tracks and donkey trails 
that cross the border into Pakistan. The locals call these trails buzrao; some American 
soldiers refer to them as “rat lines.” The routes are almost impossible to monitor because 
they cross steep, forested mountainsides that provide cover from aircraft. After firefights, 
the Americans can listen in on Taliban radio communications calling for more ammunition 
to be brought by donkey along these lines. 
Insurgent operations in the valley are run by an Egyptian named Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, who 
married locally and has been fighting here since the jihad against the Soviets. Ikhlas is paid 
directly by al-Qaeda. He shares responsibility for the area with an Afghan named Ahmad 
Shah, whose forces in 2005 cornered the navy-seal team and shot down the Chinook 
helicopter. Competing with them for control of the area—and al-Qaeda financing—is an 
Arabist group called Jamiat-e Dawa el al Qurani Wasouna. The J.D.Q., as it is known by 
American intelligence, is suspected of having links to both the Saudi and Kuwaiti 
governments, as well as to Pakistan’s infamous intelligence services. Both groups are 
thought to pay and train local Afghan fighters to attack coalition forces in the area. 
The first firefight of the day happens around noon, when a Chinook comes in to drop a 
load of supplies. The men have lit a red-smoke stick, meaning that it’s a hot landing zone, 
and the Chinook starts taking fire as soon as it settles in low over the ridge. The pilot 
dumps his slingload and then bears off hard to the north while Restrepo’s heavy guns open 
up. Someone has spotted muzzle flashes at a house in the next valley down, and the men 
pepper it with machine-gun fire. The house is painted a distinctive white and sits at the 
edge of an insurgent-held village named Laui Kalay. Eventually the muzzle flashes stop. 
The men work until the next firefight, an hour later. A Black Hawk dropping off the 
battalion sergeant major takes fire at the kop, and its Apache escort cranks a high turn over 
the valley and drops down to investigate. It makes a low run to the south and takes fire 
from the same white house. The men shake their heads and mutter strange compliments 
about anyone who would shoot at an Apache. The helicopter banks so hard it nearly goes 
upside down, and it comes in like some huge, furious insect, unleashing a long burp of 30-
mm.-cannon fire. The house undulates with impacts, and then whoever is inside shoots 
again. 
 “Jesus,” someone says. “That takes balls.” 
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The houses in the valley are constructed of shelf rock and massive cedar timbers, and they 
have withstood 500-pound bombs. The Apache tears into it a few more times and then 
loses interest and loops back up the valley. The smoke around the house gradually clears, 
and after a few minutes we can see people standing on the roof. The villages are built on 
such steep hillsides that it is possible to step off the road onto the rooftops, which is what 
these people have done. A woman appears with a child, and then another woman wanders 
up. 
“The women and children are there first, they’re on top of the roof,” says a private named 
Brendan O’Byrne, who is watching through a spotting scope. Standing next to him at the 
heavy machine gun is a soldier named Sterling Jones, busy working away on a lollipop. 
Jones has just pumped 150 rounds into the house. “They’re on top of the roof just so we 
can see them,” O’Byrne continues. “Now the men are arriving. We got one male, fighting 
age, on top of the roof He knows that we won’t shoot, because there are women and 
children there.” 
The American rules of engagement generally forbid soldiers to target a house unless 
someone is shooting from it, and discourage them from targeting anything if civilians are 
nearby. They can shoot people who are shooting at them and they can shoot people who 
are carrying a weapon or a handheld radio. The Taliban know this and leave weapons 
hidden in the hills. When they want to launch an attack they just walk out to their firing 
positions and pick up their weapons. Following a late-afternoon firefight, they can easily 
be home for dinner. 
The reason for all this caution—other than the obvious moral issues—is that killing 
civilians simply makes the war harder. With their superior weapons, the U.S. military can 
kill insurgents all day long, but the only possibility of a long-term victory lies in the 
civilian population’s denying aid and refuge to the insurgents. The Russian military, which 
invaded this country in 1979, most emphatically did not understand this. They came in 
with a massive, heavily armored force, moved about in huge convoys, and bombed 
everything that moved. It was a textbook demonstration of exactly how not to fight an 
insurgency. More than one million people died—7 percent of the pre-war civilian 
population—and a truly popular uprising eventually drove the Russians out. 
American forces are far more sensitive to humanitarian concerns than the Russians were—
and far more welcomed—but they still make awful mistakes. In June, jumpy American 
soldiers in Korengal shot into a truck full of young men who had refused to stop at a local 
checkpoint, killing several. The soldiers said they thought they were about to be attacked; 
the survivors said they had been confused about what to do. Both sides were probably 
telling the truth. 
Faced with the prospect of losing the tenuous support that American forces had earned in 
the northern half of the valley, the battalion commander arranged to address community 
leaders in person after the accident. Standing in the shade of some trees by the banks of the 
Pech River last June, Colonel William Ostlund explained that the deaths were the result of 
a tragic mistake and that he would do everything in his power to make it right. That 
included financial compensation for the grieving families. After several indignant speeches 
by various elders, one very old man stood up and spoke to the villagers around him. 
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“The Koran offers us two choices, revenge and forgiveness,” he said. “But the Koran says 
that forgiveness is better, so we will forgive. We understand that it was a mistake, so we 
will forgive. The Americans are building schools and roads, and because of this, we will 
forgive.” 
It was probably no coincidence that the site chosen for this meeting was the foot of a steel 
bridge that the Americans had just built over the fast, violent Pech. According to Colonel 
Ostlund, there was a possibility that the Taliban had paid the driver of the truck to not stop 
at the checkpoint when ordered to. By the colonel’s reasoning, the Taliban would win a 
strategic victory no matter what: either they would find out how close they could get a 
truck bomb to an American checkpoint, or there would be civilian casualties that they 
could exploit. 
Whatever the truth of that particular incident, the Taliban have certainly learned the value 
of American mistakes. Around the same time as the checkpoint shooting, coalition air 
strikes killed seven Afghan children at a mosque compound in the southeastern part of the 
country. Reaction was predictably outraged, but almost lost in the outcry was the 
testimony of survivors. They allegedly told coalition forces that before the air strike al-
Qaeda fighters in the area—who undoubtedly knew they were going to be bombed—had 
beaten the children to prevent them from leaving. 
“We had surveillance on the compound all day,” a nato spokesman explained. “We saw no 
indication there were children inside.” 
The soldiers of Second Platoon lurch out of their cots and feel around for weapons in the 
electric-blue light before dawn. The dark shapes around them are the mountains from 
which they will get shot at when the sun rises. A local mosque injects the morning silence 
with a first call to prayer. Another day in the Korengal. 
The men assemble with their trousers untucked from their boots and their faces streaked 
with dirt and stubble. They wear flea collars around their waists and combat knives in the 
webbing of their body armor. Some have holes in their boots. Several have furrows in their 
uniforms from rounds that barely missed. They carry family photographs behind the 
bulletproof steel plates on their chests, and a few carry photographs of women in their 
helmets, or letters. Some have never had a girlfriend. Every single man seems to have a 
tattoo. They are mostly in their early 20s, and many of them have known nothing but war 
and life at home with their parents. 
In my time in the Korengal, only one soldier told me that he joined the army because of 
September 11. The rest are here because they were curious or bored or because their 
fathers had been in the army or because the courts had given them the choice of combat or 
jail. No one I talked to seemed to have regretted the choice. “I joined the infantry to get out 
of people work and shit,” one soldier told me. “My main thing was partying. What was I 
going to do, keep partying and living with my mom?” 
A short, brawny team leader named Aron Hijar said he enlisted because he understood a 
fundamental truth about a volunteer army: if people like him don’t sign up, everyone his 
age will be subject to a draft. When he told his family about his decision, to a person they 
urged him against it, but no one could say why. Hijar was a fitness trainer in California; he 
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was bored, and his grandfather had fought in World War II, so he went down to the army 
recruiting office and signed the papers. He decided to keep a journal, though, so others 
could know what it was like. “When my children, if I have any, decide to go into the 
military, I’ll say, ‘You can do whatever you want, but you got to read this first,’ԝ” Hijar 
explains. “It has everything, the good times, the bad times, everything that ever meant 
anything to me.” 
The men start their day by moving the supplies that were slingloaded onto the ridgetop the 
day before. One man grumbles about having to do it so early in the morning, until 
someone else points out that they could always do it in broad daylight under fire. The 
supplies are mostly bottled water and M.R.E.’s, and it takes about half an hour for the men 
to skid them down into camp on a plastic evacuation sled and unload them. When they’re 
done, they sit on their cots and knife open the M.R.E.’s for breakfast while a specialist 
named Brian Underwood drops to the ground and starts doing push-ups in full body armor. 
Specialist Brian Underwood shouts out to his gunner 
while preparing grenades, during an insurgent assault 
on Restrepo. 
Underwood competes as a bodybuilder and is probably 
the strongest man in the platoon besides Carl 
Vandenberge, who stands six feet five and weighs 250. 
Specialist Vandenberge doesn’t say much but smiles a 
lot and is reputed to be a computer genius back home. 
In June, I saw him throw an injured man over his 
shoulder, ford a river, and then carry him up a hill. His 
hands are so big he can palm sandbags. He turned 
down a basketball scholarship to join the army. He 
says he has never lifted weights in his life. 
“Vandenberge, you big bastard,” I overheard someone 
say to him once. It was out of the blue and utterly 
affectionate. Vandenberge didn’t look up. 
“My bad,” he just said. 
Battle-Tested 
“get his waist! get his waist!” 
Little gouts of dirt erupting from the ground. The workman-like hammering of a heavy 
machine gun. A soldier named Miguel Gutierrez is down.  
“up on the fuckin’ ridge!” 
“how many rounds you got?” 
“he’s in the draw!” 
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Everyone is yelling, but I hear only the parts between the bursts of gunfire. The .50-caliber 
is laboring away inside the bunker and Angel Toves is taking fire from the east and trying 
to unjam his machine gun and spent shells are vomiting in a golden arc out of another 
machine gun to my left. We’re getting hit from the east and the south and the west, and the 
guy to our west is putting rounds straight into the compound. I duck into the bunker, where 
Sergeant Mark Patterson is calling grid points into the radio and the platoon medic—the 
one who replaced Restrepo—is hunched over Gutierrez. Gutierrez was on top of a hesco 
when we got hit and he jumped off and no one knows if he took a bullet or just broke his 
leg. Three men dragged him into the bunker under fire while Teodoro Buno hit the ridge 
with a shoulder-fired rocket and now he’s lying on a cot, groaning, with his pant leg slit up 
to his knee. 
“Guttie’s fuckin’ hit, dude,” I hear Mark Solowski say to Jones, deeper in the bunker. 
There’s a momentary pause in the firing so Rice can figure out what’s going on, and the 
men are talking low enough that Guttie can’t hear. I ask Jones what happened. 
“We just got fuckin’ rocked,” Jones says. 
The most immediate threat is a grenade attack from the draw, and someone has to make 
sure that whoever is down there is killed or pushed back before he gets any closer. That 
means leaving the cover of the outpost and shooting—completely exposed—from the lip 
of the draw. Rice moves to the gap in the hescos and steps into the open and unloads 
several long bursts of gunfire and then steps back and calls for 203s, which are grenades 
shot from an M16-attached launcher. Steve Kim sprints to the bunker and grabs a rack of 
203s and a weapon and sprints back and hands them to Rice. Bravery comes in many 
forms, and in this case it’s a function of Rice’s concern for his men, who in turn act 
bravely out of concern for him and one another. It’s a self-sustaining loop that works so 
well that officers occasionally have to remind their men to take cover during firefights. 
The rounds snapping in over the sandbags can become an abstraction to men who have 
been too well drilled in the larger, violent choreography of a firefight.  
Rice was once reprimanded for smoking during a firefight. He’s not smoking now, but he 
might as well be. He walks into the open like he’s in his bathrobe going out to get the 
morning paper and pumps several rounds into the draw and then steps back to cover. He’s 
aiming close, the detonation coming almost immediately after the shot, and, after he’s 
finished, retreats to the bunker to check on Guttie. 
Guttie wasn’t hit, as it turns out, but he broke his tibia and fibula jumping off the hesco. 
The medic has given him a morphine stick to suck on and Guttie’s stretched out on a cot 
listening to his iPod and staring up at the plywood ceiling of the bunker. “I find it odd that 
an airborne-qualified soldier jumps five feet and breaks his ankle,” a soldier named Tanner 
Stichter comments. 
“And by the way, I ain’t wipin’ your ass,” adds Corporal Old, the medic. 
Guttie asks Hijar for a cigarette and lies there smoking and sucking on the morphine. 
Brendan Olson is asleep against some sandbags and Kim is reading a Harry Potter book 
and, next to Guttie, Underwood is lying with his tattooed arms folded over his chest. The 
men get hit one more time that afternoon, another 20-minute blur of gunfire and shouting 
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and rounds slapping into dirt. Everything seems backward in a firefight: the snap of the 
bullets going by is the first sound you hear, and then—many seconds later—the far-off 
staccato of the machine gun that fired them. Men who get hit from a great distance don’t 
hear the gunshots until they’re down, and some men never get to hear the gunshots at all. 
The fighting is over by dusk, and the men gather again by the bunker in a weirdly 
lighthearted mood. O’Byrne once showed me footage shot by another soldier of him in a 
firefight. He’s in the bunker returning fire when a burst of rounds comes in that smacks the 
sandbags all around him and sends him to the floor. When he gets up, he’s laughing so 
hard he can barely work his weapon. Something like that is happening now, only it’s most 
of the platoon and it’s delayed by several hours. They’ve been hit hard today, a man’s 
broken his leg, and the enemy has figured out how to get within a hundred yards of us. In a 
situation like that, maybe finding something to laugh about is as crucial as food and sleep. 
The light mood ends abruptly when Sergeant Rice gets off the radio with the kop. The 
military eavesdropping operation, code-named Prophet, has been listening in on Taliban 
radio communications in the valley, and the news isn’t good. “Intel says they’ve just 
brought 20 hand grenades into the valley,” Rice says. “And 107-mm. rockets and three 
suicide vests. So get ready.” 
Ranch House, everyone is thinking, but no one says it. Ranch House was an American 
firebase in Nuristan that nearly got overrun last spring. Before it was finished, the 
Americans were throwing hand grenades out the bunker door and calling for aircraft to 
strafe their own base. They survived, but barely: 11 out of the 20 defenders were wounded. 
“You don’t get 20 hand grenades to throw from 300 meters,” Jones finally says to no one 
in particular. He’s smoking a cigarette and looking down at his feet. “They’re going to try 
to breach this motherfucker.” 
No one says much for a while, and eventually the men drift off toward their cots. As soon 
as it’s full dark the helicopters are going to come to lift Guttie out, and there’s not much to 
do until then. Jones is sitting on the cot next to me, smoking intently, and I ask what got 
him into the military in the first place. I’d heard he was a star athlete in high school and 
was supposed to go to the University of Colorado on an athletic scholarship. Now he’s on 
a hilltop in Afghanistan.  
“I pretty much prepped my whole life to play basketball,” Jones says. “I could run the 40 
in 4.36 and bench-press 385 pounds. But I was making money the illegal way, and I got 
into the army because I needed a change. I pretty much went into the army for my mother 
and my wife. My mom raised me on her own, and she 
didn’t raise me to be selling drugs and shit.” 
The 120-mm.-mortar squad at the KOP base. 
That night I sleep in my boots with my gear close to 
me and a vague plan of trying to make it off the 
backside of the ridge if the unimaginable happens. It’s 
not realistic, but it allows me to fall asleep. The next 
morning comes clear and quiet, with a sharp little 
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feeling of autumn in the air, and the men fall to working as soon as the sun is up. They 
stop only when a squad of Scouts shows up to deliver a hex wrench that Rice needs to fix 
one of the heavy weapons. After 20 minutes the Scouts shoulder their packs and head back 
toward the kop, and I grab my gear to join them. It’s a two-hour walk, and we take our 
time on the steep slopes in the heat of the day. The squad leader is a 25-year-old sniper 
from Utah named Larry Rougle, who has done six combat tours since September 11. His 
marriage has fallen apart, but he has a three-year-old daughter. 
“I usually vote Republican, but they’re all so divisive,” Rougle says on the way down. We 
are taking a rest break in the shade of some trees; Rougle is the only man who looks like 
he doesn’t need it. “Obama’s the only candidate on either side who’s actually talking about 
unity, not division. That’s what this country needs right now, so he’s got my vote.” 
Ten minutes later we’re moving again, and just outside the kop we take two bursts of 
machine-gun fire that stitch the ground behind us and make leaves twitch over our heads. 
We take cover until the kop’s mortars start hitting back, and then we count to three and run 
the last stretch of ground into the base. A soldier is watching all this from the entrance to 
his tent. There’s something strange about him, though. 
He’s laughing his ass off as we run by. 
Three weeks after I left the Korengal Valley, Battle Company and other units from the 
Second of the 503rd conducted a coordinated air assault on the Abas Ghar. They were 
searching for foreign fighters thought to be hiding on the upper ridges, including Abu 
Ikhlas, the locally renowned Egyptian commander. Several days into the operation, 
Taliban fighters crept to within 10 feet of Sergeant Rougle, Sergeant Rice, and Specialist 
Vandenberge and attacked. Rougle was hit in the head and killed instantly. Rice was shot 
in the stomach and Vandenberge was shot in the arm, but both survived. Nearby, a Scout 
position was overrun and the Scouts fled and then counterattacked with help from Hijar, 
Underwood, Buno, and Matthew Moreno. They retook the position and then helped 
evacuate the wounded. Rice and Vandenberge walked several hours down the mountain to 
safety. 
The following night, First Platoon walked into an ambush and lost two men, with four 
wounded. One of the dead, Specialist Hugo Mendoza, was killed trying to prevent Taliban 
fighters from dragging off a wounded sergeant named Josh Brennan. He succeeded, but 
Brennan died the following day at a U.S. military base in Asadabad. An estimated 40 or 50 
Taliban were killed, most of them foreign fighters. Three Pakistani commanders were also 
killed, as well as a local commander named Mohammad Tali. Locals claim that five 
civilians also died when the U.S. military dropped a bomb on a house where two fighters 
were hiding. 
The incident caused village elders to declare jihad against the American forces in the 
valley. 
By: Sebastian Junger is a Vanity Fair contributing editor. 
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